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The Performative Edge of Non-Politicians: Populism and Shifting Legitimacy in US 
Presidential Politics 




Building on Butler’s theorization of legitimacy as performative and dynamic rather than 
institutionally enshrined, this chapter explores the paradoxical performativity of 
contemporary populism. It asks how populists should be understood to operate 
performatively in ways that make them particularly successful in attracting followers. 
Populist speech acts pose a challenge to traditional theorizations of performativity: they seem 
to be successful in spite of the fact that they work through the disavowal, not the affirmation, 
of the authority that would normally be assumed necessary to make a performative speech act 
felicitous. Drawing on examples of persistent US presidential populism since Watergate, this 
chapter posits that contemporary populism demands an expanded and revised understanding 
of the conditions necessary to achieve performative felicity. 
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For more than a decade, scholars have been exploring the performative dimensions of 
populism. According to Ernesto Laclau’s well-known theory, for instance, populism 
functions as a performative phenomenon brought about when there is widespread 
dissatisfaction with the political establishment, such that this dissatisfaction itself becomes 
the marker of identity for the emerging populist movement (2005). More recent work, such as 
that of Benjamin Moffitt (2016), looks at populism from the other side; here, it is the populist 
politician’s performative evocation of a state of crisis that is in focus, rather than the process 
of populist identity formation among the electorate. Neither Laclau nor Moffitt, however, 
devotes sustained attention to theorizing the connection between a populist politician and 
their supporters, to the strange attraction or the quality of the representative relationship that 
exists between them. One of the most compelling questions about contemporary populism, 
concerning how populists operate performatively in ways that make them particularly 
successful in attracting followers, is thus left open. 
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 This chapter will build on Butler’s theory of shifting legitimacy, as articulated in 
Excitable Speech (1997), to investigate how populist speech acts might be seen as working 
performatively to shift legitimacy in ways that controvert the rules of how performative 
speech acts are commonly assumed to function. For present purposes, populist speech acts 
are defined as those that follow the populist style, in that they set up a binary division 
between “the people” and “the establishment,” evoke a sense of crisis, and are performed in a 
strikingly media-savvy and personalized style (see Moffitt 2016, 43-45).1 I want to suggest 
that the successful anti-establishment speech acts of populist politicians are noteworthy for 
the performative operation, that of lifting a self-styled outsider to (or a maverick within) a 
political system into a position of significant power. In other words, the performativity of 
populist speech acts is of interest, because anti-establishment performatives seem to be 
successful in spite of the fact that they work through the disavowal, rather than the 
affirmation, of the kind of authority that would normally be assumed necessary to make a 
performative speech act felicitous. Populist speech acts thus enact a kind of paradoxical 
performativity that requires us to expand and revise our understanding of the conditions 
necessary to achieve performative felicity.  
 Following the rise of right-wing populists like Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and 
Thierry Baudet in Europe and worldwide, anti-establishment and populist rhetoric have 
become extremely common in contemporary politics, such that newspapers and scholarship 
are at this moment awash with accounts of the global ascendancy of populism (Moffitt 2016; 
Cox 2018; Rachman 2019). Still, this style of political performance is perhaps nowhere more 
visible than in performances of the US presidency since Watergate, where it coincides with a 
sharp decline in political trust (Pew Research Center 2019). Nor is it limited to the period 
since Watergate: already in 1964, the notable Americanist Richard Hofstadter identified what 
he called “the paranoid style” as a phenomenon of international politics that had “more scope 
and force among us [Americans] than it has had in many other countries of the Western 
world” (2008, 7). However, while Hofstadter argued that the fully-fledged paranoid style 
with its anti-establishment conspiracy thinking and disregard for facts was performed 
exclusively by minority movements in the US, my recent research suggests otherwise. The 
former Democratic and Republican White House speechwriters I interviewed for my research 
took it as a given that anti-establishmentarianism and the assertion of outsider status have 
become dominant elements in US national, and especially presidential, politics (Peetz 2019). 
Speechwriters noted that it has become “fun and successful to run against Washington in 
national [politics]” and described Washington as obviously “toxic.”2  Moreover, the last two 
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presidential elections have been all about change: 2008 saw Barack Obama running as 
someone who, as a first-term senator, could still count as somewhat of a Washington 
outsider, whilst John McCain presented himself as a long-time maverick in the US Senate.3 
In 2016, Hillary Clinton struggled against the public perception of herself as a figure of the 
establishment, a perception that was pushed further by her direct opponent Donald Trump.4 
Clinton also faced a significant anti-establishment primary challenge from maverick 
independent senator Bernie Sanders. 
 In light of the ubiquity of contemporary populism and, in particular, its strong 
persistence in US presidential politics for the last four decades, this chapter aims to show that 
its successful performers achieve a complex and noteworthy performative gesture. This 
gesture further brings into focus how populism functions within a system of institutional 
politics. Although Butler’s work does not usually feature in populism scholarship, I argue 
that her ideas around performativity and legitimacy can illuminate the paradoxical 
performativity of populism. While other scholars working on performativity, such as J. L. 
Austin and Pierre Bourdieu, highlight the importance of a speaker’s pre-existing authority to 
the felicitousness of his/her utterance, Butler is keen to introduce an element of dynamism 
into the thinking around performativity and legitimacy. As I aim to show here, the decoupling 
of legitimacy from institutional authority is fundamental to populism. For this reason, 
Butler’s ideas about shifting legitimacy are helpful in thinking through the otherwise 
confounding split between the performative edge of the anti-institutional outsider and what 
appears to be the growing performative ineffectiveness of political institutions.  
 
  
The Paradoxical Performativity of Populism 
 
To understand the paradoxical performativity of populism, it first needs to be clarified how 
political representation works as a performative practice. According to the influential theory 
of the “representative claim” (Saward 2006; 2010; 2014), politicians’ public performances 
are constitutive of the representative relationship between them and their constituents. 
Politicians making claims to represent must perform their ability to tap into the prevailing 
political concerns and aspirations of the intended audience in a way that appears credible to 
that audience. Through their performances, they will then propose solutions to the audience’s 
concerns and ways of working towards the realization of their aspirations. If a representative 
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claim is successful, then the politician becomes the representative of a particular 
constituency, for instance through electoral success.  
 If we follow the thinking of J. L. Austin and Pierre Bourdieu, we would need to posit 
that a politician’s ability to make credible representative claims is closely tied to their pre-
existing authority or at least their ability to perform their connection to and eligibility to hold 
institutional authority. For Austin, the felicitousness of performative utterances is typically 
determined by pre-established conventions and the acceptance of the authority of the speaker 
by all parties. Thus, a performative utterance depends on “some previous procedure, tacit or 
verbal” that must “have first constituted the person who is to do the ordering an authority” 
(Austin 1962, 29). In this view, those who operate outside of the boundaries of ritual, 
convention, and pre-established authority are not able to make the kinds of felicitous 
utterances that may be performed by authorities. Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power 
(1991), which Butler critiques in Excitable Speech (1997), separates the felicitousness of 
performative utterances even more definitively from the speech act itself and instead ties 
felicitousness specifically to institutional authority. For Bourdieu, language cannot precede 
authority; it merely expresses it, and thus it is “the participation in the authority of the 
institution, which makes all the difference” (1991, 109, emphasis in original). “Language at 
most represents this authority, manifests and symbolizes it” (ibid.), he argues, stressing that 
an authorized spokesperson depends on his “accumulated symbolic capital,” here taken to 
mean his prior legitimacy, rather than anything inherent in the speech act itself (1991, 111, 
emphasis in original).  
 Following Austin’s and especially Bourdieu’s logic, politicians seeking election (i.e. 
entry into a system that confers institutional authority) would naturally attempt to court 
institutional affiliation and authority, for instance by emphasizing how well connected they 
are. Indeed, at least in the United States, figures of incumbent re-elections have historically 
been notably high,5 as one would expect if pre-established authority implied performative 
advantage. In short, we would have to assume that political audiences find incumbents and 
well-connected candidates with strong institutional ties to be more credible as possible future 
representatives than outsiders who lack the social power conferred by “an authority whose 
limits are identical with the extent of delegation by the institution” (Bourdieu 1991, 109).  
 But if we consider the fact that, in 2016, Hillary Clinton’s claim to a high degree of 
prior institutional authority fell largely flat, then this configuration becomes rather more 
complex. Being a presidential candidate who had previously been a first lady, a senator, and a 
secretary of state did not strengthen Clinton’s representative claim. A former Democratic 
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White House speechwriter I interviewed admitted that “people are not very open to the 
Hillary Clinton argument [which is]: ‘I understand, I’ve been around a long time, I 
understand how it works, and so you need me to help sort it out’.” In addition to this, some of 
the (illegally leaked) emails of Hillary Clinton campaign staff members reveal the campaign 
struggling with Clinton’s status as part of the political establishment, which, far from being a 
major asset, was apparently considered to be somewhat of a liability.6 In contrast to this, 
Donald Trump’s performances of outsiderness, manifested in promises to “drain the swamp” 
(see Donald J. Trump for President 2016), resonated much more strongly. Trump’s campaign 
launch announcement on 16 June 2015, for instance, was based on nationalistic, anti-
immigrant appeals to the white working classes about beating Japan at manufacturing cars, 
and beating Mexico “at the border,” because Mexico, just like China, was portrayed in the 
speech as “killing us economically.” This simplistic and openly racist nationalism was 
complemented by Trump’s repeated claim that “all of these politicians that I’m running 
against now” were stupid, dissociating, and “don’t have a clue” about leadership, whereas 
Trump presented himself as a business leader who had done “an amazing job” amassing his 
own “net worth” while watching the politicians from afar and coming to the conclusion that 
“[t]hey will never make America great again” (Time Staff 2015). The performativity of this 
sort of presidential anti-establishment rhetoric might then be seen to operate in the opposite 
direction from Austin’s standard model of performative felicity: not through the enforcement, 
but through the disavowal of the kind of authoritative backing with which one might assume 
such speakers would be seen, and would wish to be seen, to be invested.  
 In other words, anti-establishment rhetoric by political outsiders or mavericks turns 
out to be performatively effective precisely because it enables and perpetuates a performative 
shift that moves legitimacy away from incumbent and previous officeholders as well as from 
established institutions. Instead, it bestows legitimacy on outsider or maverick politicians. It 
is thus precisely these politicians’ perceived lack of previous affiliation with the maligned 
institutional establishment and not their pre-existing institutional authority that makes the 
performative operation felicitous. It may be tempting to suggest that performative success in 
the case of Trump simply becomes tied to another kind of authority (economic, financial, 
etc.), as in his performances of his economic successes, but the case is not so clear-cut. While 
Trump might indeed have appealed to a specific kind of American anti-political 
entrepreneurialism (see Brown 1997),7 Sanders’s appeal during the 2016 campaign was not 
tied to any kind of business acumen and was instead largely due to his maverick position 
within the US Senate, which made him a (relative) outsider to the party system. Social power 
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in this case therefore does not stem from “an authority whose limits are identical with the 
extent of delegation by the institution” (Bourdieu 1991, 109), but on a speaker’s (credible 
performance of her/his) lack of delegated institutional authority. This is where Butler’s 
thinking around legitimacy becomes pertinent. 
  
 
Anti-Establishment Rhetoric and Dynamic Legitimacy 
 
In contradistinction to Austin and Bourdieu, Excitable Speech (1997) envisions performative 
utterances as dynamic vis-à-vis established power structures. Drawing on Derrida’s reading 
of Austin (1988), Butler seeks to overturn Bourdieu’s emphasis on the primacy of social 
power, which reduces the power ascribed to the performative utterance itself, making it 
appear epiphenomenal at best. She charges Bourdieu with failing to “theorize the particular 
force produced by the utterance as it breaks with prior context” and failing “to take account 
of the way in which a performative can break with existing context and assume new contexts, 
refiguring the terms of legitimate utterance themselves” (1997, 148, 150). In Butler’s view, 
performative utterances themselves can, by rehearsing “the conventional formulae in non-
conventional ways,” provoke a shift in the terms of legitimacy so that “an invocation that has 
no prior legitimacy can have the effect of challenging existing forms of legitimacy, breaking 
open the possibility of future [social institutional] forms” (147). This way of theorizing 
performativity, I posit, is particularly pertinent when thinking through the seemingly 
paradoxical performative edge of the non-politician or political outsider and the systemic 
effects of populist rhetoric.  
 If politicians employ anti-establishment rhetoric and present themselves as outsiders 
in making a representative claim, we can assume that they are doing so in an attempt to 
mobilize anti-establishment aspirations and political distrust that they suppose are prevalent 
political concerns among their audiences. What the populist speech act is doing, then, is 
making use of existing dissatisfaction with the political establishment to boost the social 
power of the outsider or maverick politician. Here, the populist movement, defined by its 
dissatisfaction with the political establishment (as in Laclau’s theory of performative 
populism), and the populist politician, defined by its anti-establishment stance and its 
performative evocation of a sense of political crisis (as in Moffitt’s theory of the populist 
style), connect. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, it is this connection between 
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populist politicians and their supporters that is thus far significantly undertheorized in 
scholarship of performativity and populism. 
 Butler’s ideas about shifting legitimacy allow us to think through the remarkable 
performative operation at work in populist speech acts: by deploying anti-establishment 
rhetoric, populists access and mobilize existing anti-establishment sentiment, thus building 
on and further stoking the suspiciousness with which the audience already regard the 
institutional structures and the political system.8 The populist binary division of society, with 
the dissatisfied people on one side and the unsatisfactory establishment on the other, is thus 
both tapped into and co-authored by these politicians–and then used for their own political 
benefit. In doing so, populists must performatively constitute themselves as individuals who 
can credibly represent “the people,” since the electorate must come to view them as outsiders 
who intend to penetrate into the contaminated system with the goal of eliminating corruption. 
“The people” are then defined by their distrust of and disillusionment with the political 
establishment while the politician’s pledge to act in their direct interest as a decontaminator 
of the system becomes the source of populist authority. In other words, in this paradoxical 
performativity, the very lack of previous authority and institutional affiliation is elevated into 
the source of the speaker’s perceived legitimacy as a political representative. If populist 
representative claims are felicitous–that is, if the politician succeeds in being perceived as a 
genuine outsider or maverick who will act on behalf of the people–that individual becomes 
the anti-establishment representative of the people and, hence, the leader of the populist 
movement. The development of this movement has to prefigure the politician’s performative 
intervention, but, although it does not entirely depend on the politician’s speech act, it is 
further strengthened and consolidated by it.  
  
 
The Populist Slope in Political Discourse 
 
The populist courting and shifting of legitimacy away from established institutions and 
towards self-styled outsiders is not without risk. The most significant risk is the possibility of 
portraying the political system as so corrupt that it is beyond redemption. Continued exposure 
to populist anti-establishmentarianism might lead to something of a “populist slope” in 
political discourse. That is, audiences who are continually exposed to representative claims 
that speak to their dissatisfaction with the political establishment come to expect the 
disavowal of institutional authority as a necessary element of any potentially credible 
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representative claim. Forcefully articulated opposition to the political establishment then 
becomes the norm. In other words, performing opposition to “Washington,” “the 
government,” or “the system” might become not just paradoxically effective as a 
performative act, but a prerequisite for performative success.  
 One of the former Democratic White House speechwriters I interviewed sketched this 
possibility in a way that highlights the complexity of the reception work political audiences 
have to do when presented with populist speech acts. The speechwriter stressed, firstly, that 
Republicans and Democrats made different kinds of anti-establishment arguments, such that, 
while Republicans had for a long time portrayed government “as being inherently inimicable 
to liberty, to freedom, to individual rights,” Democrats tended to emphasize the need to 
“bring a new perspective into Washington and make government work because government 
has to work.” However, when pressed to clarify whether the differences between these 
arguments came across in a political environment where everyone runs against Washington, 
the speechwriter conceded that Obama’s argument about Washington being dominated by 
special interests and Trump’s argument about the system being rigged were “the same 
argument used to different ends.” Especially when Bernie Sanders’s forcefully articulated 
anti-establishmentarianism came into play on the Democratic side, the speechwriter 
suggested that political discourse might end up in “a dangerous place,” one where the 
government was seen as fundamentally corrupt and irredeemable by default. The 
performative edge of the self-styled “non-politician,” in short, can have profound effects on a 
system of institutional politics. Through their paradoxical performativity, populist anti-
establishment performances restructure the terms of legitimacy in a way that not only 
separates institutional authority from legitimacy, but that, in time, can call the system’s very 
existence into question. 
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1 While populism is notoriously difficult to define, the consideration of populist-style 
performances (rather than “populism” as a more diffuse phenomenon) captures a number of 
significant characteristics of contemporary populism, as identified in leading scholarship. 
Populism has increasingly become a mainstream feature of democratic politics in the West 
(Mudde 2004; Arditi 2007; Moffitt 2016) and exists on a continuum (Rooduijn, de Lange, 
and van der Brug, 2014; Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013), such that populists can express only 
some elements of populism and can do so more or less forcefully. This also justifies the joint 
discussion of outsider appeals made by Obama, Trump, and Sanders, politicians who 
otherwise differ markedly in their performance styles.  
2 For ethical reasons, the data are anonymized. For a detailed account of my interviewing 
method, see Peetz 2019. 
3 An outsider is someone who stands outside of and professes to lack links to the institutional 
system. A maverick, by contrast, is someone who is affiliated with a political party and/or 
occupies political office, but frequently votes against the party line, works to reshape the party, 
or becomes an independent (Barr 2009, 34). Before running for president, Obama was advised 
by senior Democrats, including Harry Reid, then Senate Majority Leader, and former Senate 
Minority Leader Tom Daschle, on the political potential of the outsiderness he could still claim 
for himself (Heilemann and Halperin 2010, 33-4, 70).  
4 Trump stressed or alluded to Clinton’s “bad experience” in all three presidential debates 
(Politico Staff 2016a; 2016b; 2016c).  
5  Increased incumbency advantage in congressional elections since the 1970s is a widely 
studied phenomenon (see,  Mayhew 1974; Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006).  
6 The leaked emails of John Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager in 2016, show 
Clinton-Kaine campaign staff members struggling with Clinton’s status as “part of the system,” 
stressing the need to show that Clinton knows “how much has to change” (Greenberg 2016) as 
well as the need to criticize the incumbent Obama administration (Schwerin 2015). 
7 The relative success of the businessman and independent candidate Ross Perot in the 1992 
presidential election, for instance, points to the persistence of this kind of business-driven 
anti-politics in US political life. 
8 In the contemporary United States, there are a number of reasons for widespread political 
dissatisfaction, such as the increasing de-democratization of US politics under neoconservative 
neoliberalism, which has arguably toxified political life even while moving towards an 
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increasingly consensual and managerial politics (Brown 2015), and the increasing 
securitization of US politics since September 11, 2001 (see Wolin 2008).  
